2019 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change



UNFCCC – Joint Side Event Carbon Pricing: Concepts, Regional Developments, and Future Governance

December 13th, 2019



Carbon Pricing: Concepts, Regional Developments, and Future Governance

Speakers & Topics

Prof. Michael Rodi, University of Greifswald, Institute for Climate Protection, Energy and Mobility (IKEM)
Emissions Trading and Energy Taxes – A European Misunderstanding

Prof. Maria Rolim, Dundee University and Brazilian Institute of Energy Law (IBDE) Carbon Pricing in Latin America

Prof. Michael Mehling, Strathclyde University & Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
Pricing Carbon at the European Border

Ms. Wan-Ting Yen, Taiwan Research Institute (TRI)
Introduction of Carbon Pricing Mechanisms in Several Asian Economies

Dr. Farid Karimi, Interdisciplinary Center for Baltic Sea Region Research (IFZO)
Carbon pricing conundrum: socio-political aspects





Emissions Trading and Energy Taxes – A

European Misunderstanding

Prof. Dr. Michael Rodi


Madrid COP25 – December 13th 2019

Emissions Trading and Carbon Taxes

- Carbon taxes may be direct carbon taxes (taxing carbon emissions) or indirect carbon taxes (taxing fossil energy products); existing energy taxes thus often are indirect carbon taxes
 - Indirect carbon taxes (or energy taxes) may even have carbon content as tax criterion (maybe next to energy content)

- Emissions trading means in this context carbon emissions trading
 - Two variants: cap-and-trade design or baseline-and-credit design





Primary criteria: Effectiveness and efficiency

Identical results for equivalent emission reductions, if there is no uncertainty regarding future prices, perfect competition in all markets, no interaction with other policies, and universal coverage (all sources of GHG emissions)

Common problem: Treatment of imported products

Ørder adjustment necessary (see presentation of Michael Mehling)



Primary criteria: Effectiveness and efficiency

Problem of both instruments (for different reasons): Effectiveness depends a lot on international cooperation

ETS: carbon market linkage difficult and time consuming

CT: multilateral carbon tax agreements difficult to reach, but interesting proposals are being developed at the moment (special problem: aviation)



Primary criteria: Effectiveness and efficiency

Problem of both instruments (for different reasons): Effectiveness stems a lot

from the anticipation of future prices

ETS: investors rely on future interventions of the legislator in case of strong price increase

CT: legislators often reluctant to foresee tax rate rises or to adapt tax rates;

formulas for automatic adaption should be developed!



Secondary criteria

Competition

Specific treatment of emission-intense, trade-exposed activities (EITE) possible within both regimes

Public finance

Concept of "double dividend" developed for taxes

Revenue recycling and climate protection investments possible in both

regimes



Secondary criteria

✓ Distributional impacts

Pass-through of costs to consumers

Suitable compensation concepts can be designed for both instruments

Instrument mix

For Both instruments need to be complimented by other politics, e.g. regulation necessary in areas of high abatement costs



Thesis 2: Emissions trading and carbon taxes have specific (dis)advantages

Arguments in favour of Emissions Trading

Environmental effects can be better targeted (cap) ++

Anti-cyclical effects regarding economic development



Thesis 2: Emissions trading and carbon taxes have specific (dis)advantages

Arguments in favour of Carbon Taxes

Administrative feasibility - implementation of emissions trading highly complex (political transaction costs) ++

Carbon price volatility and unsecurity regarding policy intervention

Implementation into a smart instrument mix – ETS and the problem of

"water bed effect"

✓ Danger of market manipulation – affects more ETS

Thesis 3: Their practical advantages depend a lot from their specific design

Emissions trading schemes are often hybrid

Combination of cap-and-trade and baseline-and-credit design (e.g. for newcomers like in EU ETS)

Practice of price corridors

In praxis emissions trading and carbon taxes are often combined and there are good reasons for that

- ETS for upstream solutions, CT for decentrelized sources (e.g. transport and buildings)
- CT can serve as floor price



Thesis 4: Practice of carbon pricing is influenced by political economy

Emissions trading is often preferred due to institutional and political reasons

- Implementation and/or changes of taxes are often a political "no-go"
- Tax legislation is often more complicated and burdensome for
 - constitutional reasons
 - Examples: California, China
 - The EU Commission favoured carbon taxes, but failed due to unanimity requirement
- **Path dependency**: Change of instrument choice only for good reasons



Results

Strong reasons for carbon pricing


Emissions trading and carbon taxes are functional equivalents in theory

Carbon taxes have strong(er), emissions trading is often preferred for reasons of political economy

Instrument design and combination more important than instrument choice



Contact Persons



Ecologic Institute Mr. Matthias Duwe matthias.duwe@ecologic.de +4 30 8688000

Responding to Climate Change (RTCC) Ms. Nicole Serrij ns@rtcc.org +44 207 7992222 Taiwan Research Institute (TRI)

Ms. Wan-Ting Yen wanting.yen@tri.org.tw

+88 6 933445204